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In the Supreme Court 
of tlte State of Utah 
LEHI IRRIGATION C0~1PANY, 
Plaintiff ·and App,ellamt, 
vs. 
CLARENCE T. JONES and ED H. 
WATSON, State Engineer of the State 
of Utah, 
Defendants and Responwernts. 
Case No. 
7189 
REPLY OF RESPONDENT JONES TO AMICUS 
CURIAE BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
While it may be doubted that the matters interjected 
by A'I'I'J;icus Curiae are properly so brought into this case, 
we have asked and have been permitted by the court, to 
file a reply to the brief so filed. The State Engineer will 
file a separate reply brief. 
'V e will cite pages fron1 the Record with the letter 
"'T~ "~ pages from th0 Transcript of Evidence 'vith the 
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2 
letter '' T' ', pages from A mieurs Curia.e brief with the 
letter "A", and pages from our first brief with the letter 
"0". 
A brief statement of facts may be of some help to the 
court. The location of natural streams and of cities may~ 
of course, be judicially noticed. As may be gleaned from 
the R.ecord, the general area irrigated since 1913 through 
the Provo Reservoir Canal extends from the upper Provo 
River northwesterly and above the cities and towns of 
Provo, Orem, Pleasant Grove, American Fork, and Lehi, 
and thence into Salt Lake County through the·Narro·ws, 
where it is syphoned under the Jordan River. 
The lands of the respondent Jones are adjacent to 
Dry Creek, 3 or 4 miles North and East of Lehi. As re-
cited in our first brief, the waters involved are naturally 
used and reused after leaving the Provo River, before 
reaching the lands of this respondent. His upper lands 
have been irrigated for many years, and since 1913 son1e 
of the water used thereon has con1e fron1 the Provo R.eser-
voir Canal. The seepage or spring water arises in his 
ovvn lands, and, the Record shovvs, 1nainly fron1 his 0"\\7ll 
irrigation on his upper land. This is indicated by his 
testin1ony as to the affect of his irrigation up there on 
the different springs. 
A good picture can be obtained as to· tl1e springs an<l 
spring areas, and the uses of the \Vater conten1plated by 
the applications, if referene is n1ade to his testin1on)· 
(T. 10-29) and to the blue prints (Exhibits 1 and 2). fii~ 
t-estin1ony is corroborated, but not disputed, except as to 
the Sn1ith spring, \vhich is above the f~hnith ditch, and i~ 
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3 
~ sho"·n in the h)\Yer right hand corner of Exhibit 2. 
\Yhether there can be any appropriation of this sp~ring, 
or any of them, for that matter, "·ill be up to the State 
Engineer, and 'vill depend upon· the final proof and final 
ff determination. 
~ Ca:)e 1-iG-±5~ .A .. pplication 17805, inYolve8 one spring, 
• Xo. 12, Ex. 1. The use fron1 this spring i~ for culinary and 
lfi doinestic purposes, and to a small extent for irrigation. 
~- The spring supplies 4 substantial strings of chicken coops 
lt and 2 residences with s1nall la\\·ns and a garden, and 
~ irrigation of about .9 acre of additional land. The total 
area covered by all these is between two and three acres, 
r 
.S 
and, of course, all the water from the coops and homes 
without diminution, flows directly to Dry Creek, and the 
irrigated portions drain thereto. This spring water has 
been put to similar uses there since sometime in 1890, in-
creased since 1913 by Provo Reservoir Canal and doubled 
s~nce 1944 ])eer Creek irrigation. 
Case 14646, Application 17806, Exhibit 2, covers 
small springs sho,Yn as }7"o. 1, No. 7, No. 8, and No. 9. 
These are on the North side of the Creek, and arise on and 
are to be used for irrigation of about · 3.24 acres 
of land from 'vhich the vvater drains into Dry Creek. 
These seeps, unless the water is so diverted therefront 
Rnd used for irrigation, could only form small and use-
less mar~hes v1ithout any additional drainage reaching 
the Creek. 
Casp 14647, Ap]Jlicati.on 17807, covers springs and 
~pring areas shown as No. 2 to No. 6, and No. 10 and No. 
11 in Exhihit 2. These are located on the South side of 
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4 
the Creek, immediately below the springs covered by the 
previous application. They substantially all drain into 
the spring area shown as No. 10, the pasture. 
This respondent testified that this whole spring area 
is rnarshy, so that it cannot be used now for pasture be-
cause the cows mire down, and it has got to be drained 
( R. 23). There is other testimony that hunters could not 
walk or ride a horse across it because of this condition. 
It is proposed to drain this into the fish pond, as shown 
on Exhibit 2. This use is non-consumptive, and could not 
diminish the return flow. 
It would seem that the beneficial use contemplated 
hy this application would not diminish the return- flow. 
On the other hand, it would appear that if the applicant 
cannot apply the waters to a beneficial use, as contenl-
plated, that his property would be substantially damaged 
and portions thereof rendered useless to him. 
If appellant, or the Provo Reservoir Company, have 
any prior rights or clear appropriations that may be af-
fected here, it n1ay be assumed that these rights will ·be 
considerd by the State Engineer in making a final de-
termination as to what, if any, "\Vaters 1nay be appro-
priated and beneficially used under these applications, 
without interference with other rights. And, in any event, 
it is certain that the n1ere approval of these applications 
does not affect any such rights, and, under the statute, 
the approval must be subject to prior right, and by its 
express term, it is subject to ~~uch rights. 
Under the Record here, there would certainly seen1 
to be some water in these springs 'vhich respondent n1ay 
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beneficially use, and which neither the appellant under 
its alleged diligence rig-ht or a rnicus c:uriae under the 
''r eber filings or 1943 diversion could claim. This is so, 
even if \Ye assumed all that they both say as correct . 
. A.pproval of the applications by the State cannot 
result in giving respondent anything that he cannot ul-
timately acquire, 'vithout interference with prior rights. 
This approYal merely leaves the matter open for deter-
nlination of the amount of water he thus 1nay acquire a 
right to use. 
On the other hand, their rejection would leave him 
helpless to protect and beneficially use. this, or even pro-
tect and use his own property. Certainly, neither of these 
objecting parties can appropriate his property .for swamp. 
storage of their water,_ if any they have here. 
In our first brief, we supported by direct authorities, 
three propositions. These were: 
1. That the issue raised on appeal as to Government 
filings on the Weber River could not, without any plead-
ings below, be raised for the first time on argument here. 
2. That the objection based on possible claims by a 
third party stranger to -the action, is not aYailable to 
appellant here. 
3. That on the merits, appellant's claims, whether 
arising under this or under its diligent creek right, as 
pleaded, did not justify rejection of these applications. 
Amicus Curiae supports our statement that the 
issue was not raised b~:- the pleadings below, and appellant 
1nakes no reply and no contention that it \Vas. On the 
claim that was pleaded by it belo,v, Arn'icus Curiae 8ays 
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that it is ' ' conceded by appellant' ' that the waters 
claimed have not been appropriated by it (A. 4); that 
it was established that appellant had no right (A. 5); and 
refers to it later as ''a defeated litigant'' (A. 7). 
Our second point, as briefed and supported, is not 
contested at all, and the authorities cited (0. 8-12) are 
not challenged. These seem to entitle respondent to an 
affirmance of the judgment here. 
The third point, on the merits as it relates to the 
appellant having no right to object to the approvals under 
its claim, as pleaded, is not questioned by it, and is en-
dorsed and enforced by ~amicus curiae. 
The point argued that it is conclusive that there is 
no unappropriated water, and the court must now per-
emptorily reject these applications, \vill be discussed 
later. 
Because of quite numerous repetitions in the an~i.cus 
ruriae brief, we will attempt to short.en this brief by 
numbering son1e contentions n1ade therein, \vhich appear 
to us to be fundan1en tally erroneous, and will discuss 
these under each nun1ber in order. \Ve will avoid extended 
discussion of the points so clearly n1ade and supported 
in the inforn1ative and excellent brief filed by the State 
Engineer. vVe cannot cite this brief as printed, as it is 
not yet out. 
So1ne main points of confusion and error by an~icus 
curiae are on the "following 111a tters : 
1. As to amicus curiae injecting his eli en t as a 
party. 
2. ..._t\.s to the nature and affect of the State En-
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7 
gineer 's proceedings. 
3. ....-\..s to the effect of the decision there or here, as 
it relates to claims of parties, or as asserted by ~amicus 
curz.ae. 
±. ..._\.s to what constitutes appropriation, or what 
is unappropriated 'Yater. Record shows no prior appro-
priation of waters is involved. 
5. ..A .. s to w·hat the court may here judicially notice. 
6. The affect of injecting application No. 12'144, 
as defeating previous contentions, and error in comment 
as to cases cited. 
BRIEF AND ARGUMENT 
I 
That Provo River Water Users cannot become a 
party by appearan~ of its attorney Amicus Cur~ae seems 
clear. A.m·icus Curiae cannot, by statement that an out-
side party asserts rights in the subject of litigation, make 
it a party. Appearance Amicus Curiae is not an appear-
ance for a party at all. It is merely as a friend of the 
court. 
. 2 A1n. Jur. pg. 679, Sec. 4. "RIG·H·TS AND 
POWERS OF AMICUS CURIAE-IN GEN-
ERAL.- As stated above, an amicus curiae is 
heard only by leave and for the assistance of the 
court upon a case already before it. He has no 
control over the. suit and no right to institute any 
proceedings therein. It seen1s clear that an amicus 
curiae cannot assu1ne the function of a party in 
an action or proceeding pending before the court, 
and that ordinarily, he cannot file a pleading in a 
cause . .J._t\n a1nicus curiae is restricted to sugges-
tions relative to Inatters apparent ·on the record 
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8 
or to matters of practice. His principal function 
is to aid the court on questions of la:w. 
* *. :1: 
The appearance of an attorney as amicus 
curiae is not an appearance for a party, although 
he may be the regularly retained attorney of the 
party.'' 
See also: 
Beall v. Beall (Ore.) 128 P. 835 at 837 
2 C.J. pg. 1325 
If it were to become a party, it is equally clear that 
it would have to do so by proper appearance and inter-
vention, and upon pleadings setting forth its claim. It 
cannot app.ear without pleadings or evidence to support 
its claim, and attempt to assert rights by mere statement 
of what it claims they are, and thus defeat the rights or 
claims of an actual party litigant. It would, obviously, 
have to be in the case in such a way that if its asserted 
claims could be adjudicated against it, it would be bound 
by such action. It could not, thus, offhand, defeat the 
clain1s of a party litigant without that party having the 
opportunity, by due process, to contest its claims. Other-
'vise, there 'vould be no order in eourt procedure and no 
end to litigation, because any nu1nher of people could 
con1e in and a~.sert clain1s taking up time of the court, 
and 'vhich, jf they 'vere properly presented and tried 
out, n1ay be found not to exist. 
The issue atte1npted to he raised, is the right of 
the vVater users Association to the \Yater fronl thr· 
~prings on respondent's property. This is a conflicting 
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right to that attempted to be initiated by the applications. 
The statement of alniC'us curia.e (A. 5) that this issue 
1i1ay be here raised by his client is obviously incorrect. 
This court has also repeatedly held that the issue of such 
conflicting w·ater rights cannot be determined at all by 
the State Engineer on such applications, or by the Court 
on appeal proceedings. (See Engineers Reply Brief.) 
Eardley r. Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. (2) 362 at 366: 
··It should silnpl~- be determined whether the 
application 'vas rightly rejected. In determining 
that question, the court stands in the same posi-
tion as the Engineer. It must determine from the 
evidence whether there is probable cause to be-
lieve that there is unappropriated water available, 
or 'vater 'vhich can be made available, for use.''· 
In this connection, it also appears that neither amicus 
curiae, nor his client, can properly assume to assert and 
represent the "Public Interest" claimed to be here in-
YolYed. "\Vaters of this State do belong to the puiblic. The 
achninistration thereof, however, is exclusively with the 
State of Utah, and is by· it enjoined upon its State En-
gineer. He is specifically charged with the duty of pre-
venting ''Taste and promoting greatest beneficial use. 
This is the policy of the State. 
100-1-3 U.C.A. 1943: 
''Beneficial use shall be the basis, the meas-
ure, and the limit of all rights to the use of water 
in this State." 
Little Cottonwood v. K·irnball, 289 P. 116, at 117 and 
''In the arid region, "\Vater is precious, and it 
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10 
is the undoubted policy of the law to prevent its 
waste and promote its largest beneficial use." 
* * * * 
''The waste of water in arid regions is an 
evil that should be condemned. vV ater is a 'pre-
cious fluid'; water is the 'life of the desert'. But 
precious to whom~ Precious to the farmer who 
uses it to make the earth give forth her bounties; 
fully as precious to him as to any other me1nher 
of the community." 
II 
The brief erroneously assumes that the approval of 
these applications, "subject to prior rights", will have 
some far reaching or destructive effect upon the 'vhole 
plan of reclamation in the State. That water rights are 
thereby adjudicated or concluded. 
We cannot add to the refutation of this assun1ption 
in the State's reply brief. Certainly, rights of persons 
not appearing in such proceeding are not touched thereby. 
Little Cottonwood v. Kintball, 289 P. 116, 118: 
"The approval of an ~-pplication to appro-
priate is only a preliminary step. It confers upon 
the applicant no perfected right to the use of 
water. It does not in any degree impair or diminish 
the existing rights of others.'' 
17anner v. Bacon, 136 P. (2) 957, 967: 
''No conclusion, finding or action of the En-
gineer in approving or rejecting an application to 
appropriate "Tater is final or binding upon any 
party \vho n1a:~ feel aggrieved thereby, except a~ 
to the right of the applicant to have his applira-
tion filed, and thereb~· fix the time of his priority, 
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11 
if he proeeeds and eon1pletes or perfects an ap-
propriation.'' 
III 
The brief states ( ~\.. 7), and repeats, that. if these 
applications are not here rejected by the court, the Provo 
River ''Tater Users ..c\.ssociation will ~~be substantially 
and adversely affected.'' Th~se assertions are wholly 
unsupported, and appear to be entirely erroneous. 
~\.s pointed out In the State's brief, not only are the 
rights recited by auz icus curiae unaffected by the En-
gineer's approval, but this is a private suit by one pro-
testant and appellant claiming it would be aggrieved by 
the appropriations sought. Nobody but the parties here-
to is, or· can be, affected by this law suit, and it must be 
r~ecided upon the clain1s and Record n1ade by the parties 
hereto. 
~\s quoted from W eil in our first brief ( 0. 10), he 
says: 
"'It is too obvious to require elaboration that 
the parties to a la'Y suit must fight it out be-
tween theinselYes, and, at the same tin1e, its re-
sults affect the1n alone." · 
It 'vould be an affront to the court for us to here cite 
authority that persons who are not parties to a suit 
can be affected in any way by the judgment therein. 
IV 
The brief appears to be entirely· in error as to what 
con~titutes an appropriation or what is appropriated 
\Vater. It repeatedly asserts that all the waters involved 
have heert appropriated by the United States, by the 
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Weber River filings, and that it "is the property of the 
:Provo River vVater Users Association.'' On this con-
tention, it apparently seeks to support the suggestion of 
the appellant, although it never contended that all the 
'vater involved came from the Weber, but sought to show, 
and did show, that some of it did not (T. 73). It is not 
true, by the Record, that all the waters sought to be ap-
propriated by Jones have accrued to his springs from 
\Veber River diversions. The testimony does indicate that 
about one-half the present flow has resulted fron1 irriga-
tion from the Deer Creek Project. But as above show·n 
(T. 73), not all Deer Creek water comes from the \-Veber. 
And, as stated above, the water of these springs has re-
~ulted from irrigation on higher land, back to and prior 
to 1913. 
It "~as found that the storage in Deer Creek was of 
\Vaters '• substantially all from the \~Veber River," but 
not all. So, it is neither shown nor found that the higher 
irrigation is all fron1 waters that can1e from the vVeber. 
This fact alone requires affirn1ance here, even if 
other clain1s \vere conceded, because if there is any w·ater 
available, or "rhich n1ay become available, the Engineer's 
approval 1nust stand (see our first brief 0.-4, and the 
State's brief). And the assertion (.Lt\.. 7) that only legal 
consequences of ''undisputed facts is presented,'' is er-
roneous. 
But, independentl~r of these, the brief of the State 
l~~ngineer herp conclusively shows that none of the \Vater~ 
ela i1ned to ha Ye been previously appropriated h;: filing:~ 
on \Veher River "·ere thus or at all appropriated. Tll0 
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13 
rases here cited establish, and it is undoubtedly the 
la"·· that the 1nere filing· of an application is not, and 
1nay neYer result in, an appropriation. This brief also 
establishe~ that the duty of the State Engineer, as en-
joined upon hhn by this court, "·as properly discharged 
here, and his disc.retion appropriately exercised. 
~\s is pointed out by ,, ... eil on vVater Rights, 3rd Ed., 
Sec. 289 (8), unappropriated \Yaters n1ay be any waters 
'vhich, for the tin1e. are not being put to a beneficial use, 
and appropriation is not accon1plished by filing an ap-
plication. He ~ays, ":-ith reference to the use of the word 
in this connection, that it is sometimes used 
• 'as denoting the first step in acquiring a right. 
· ~-\ppropriation is a n1uch abused 'vord; it is often 
loosely spoken of as the prelin1inary step-such 
as filing a notice? Inaking a claim to the "\Vater, or 
the like', """hich 1s a 'vholly improper use of the 
"-ord.' · 
In our first brief \Ve cited lTtah cases (0. 9) that 
appropriation is the actual application of the \Vater to a 
heneficial use. These \Ya ters clearly are not being so 
applied hy any objector here. 
\\:r e call attention no"- to some additional matters in 
this connection . ...-\s "-e have already pointed out, this 
third party clain1 is not in issue, and is not presented, 
and is not before the court on this appeal. In this case, 
"·e had onl~ .. to meet the claim, as alleged, of appellant's 
(li]i_g-ence right. The trial court harl onl~.,. to determine 
\\·h0thrr tl1at clain1 required the Engineer to reject the 
appl1eation. The Record ""as made on this basis. \Ve could 
not havr made a Recor(l "-hich n1ight cover an~'" snggeR-
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tion ~y a stranger in the court here on appeal. 
We have also pointed out, and the State's brief has 
established, that claims such as are now suggested, in-
volving the determination of: quieting of title to water 
rights, could not have been involved or settled in an ac~ 
tion of this character, to review the discretion of the 
State Engineer. 
We also point out that this third party claim was 
never suggested until after the pleadings were settled, 
all evidence introduced, arguments made, and the case 
decided (T. 113). When it was suggested, or attempted, 
by the offer of the applications to appropriate Weber 
water, one· objection was that these were not material 
to the issue pleaded CT. 117). Whether this was the sole 
ground of rejection, or not, we do not know. The court, 
.however, indicated that it thou~ht this ground was well 
taken (T. 118-119). This ruling, rejecting these applica~ 
tions, is not challenged· here. The applications are not in 
evidence. 
· As further indicating the great number of questions 
that 1nay be raised if the court vvere to attempt to liti-
gate the alleged claims, as suggested by amicus cur,iae, 
as this is elaborated in the State Engineer's brief, we 
call the court's attention. to the fact that these are per-
colating underground waters. If respondent's water from 
his higher lands had been permitted merely to run on the 
surface down to this lower ground, that would present, 
the mere question of reuse by a user. As we suggested in 
our first brief., that is possibly the· only claim to the· 
right of reuse that could ever be involved here. However, 
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as to percolating '\Vaters, the question of identity beco1nes 
inYnlYed, in addition to the question of return and ming-
ling "Tith other sources of supply. And, the decisions of 
this r.ourt have thus far indicated that no one, except the 
(nvner of the land 'vhere pereolating "·ater arises, can 
establish a clahn thereto, as long as it is not allowed to 
eseape fron1 his land ( 0. 5). 
There 'vould also be the issue as to '\vhether these 
seep~ result fron1 son1e escape water of prior claimant, 
as suggested by the State Engineer. And necessity of ex-
ploring the 'vhole field of ~ ''Ya ters from foreign sources'' 
(See\\' eil, \""" ol. 1 p. 60). 
In vie\\- of "-hat has been said, it would seem to be 
unnecessary to enter into a technical argument with 
reference to the contention of amicus r:uri.ae on the men-
tion of ~'unappropriated waters on our statute.'' A p-
parently, in ans\\'er to our brief ( 0. 4) citing the deeisions 
of this court that it is the duty of the State Engineer to 
grant the application if there "is or may be" water 
available for appropriation, or "if there is probable 
cause to believe there is unappropriated waters ... 
,,·hich can be made available for use,'' a somewhat inl-
passioned argument is made (A. 10). It is to the effect 
that "if it is brought to the attention of the State En-
gineer or the court at one or another stage of the pro-
ceeding that any of the water involved is not unap·pro-
priated," then the application n1ust be arbitrarily re-
jected at the threshold. That this is not the interpreta-
tion given to our statutes by this court, is established by 
he State':--: brief here. It i~ arguPcl that an affir1native 
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showing must be made before the State Engineer that 
there is no unappropriated water, or, otherwise, if there 
were no protest, the Engineer must allow any application. 
Of course, the showing that was made to the State En-
gineer is not before the court, and the statute also author-
izes and requires an investigation by the State Engineer 
himself upon the ground. 
Coming now to the statutes (A. 10), the use of "un-
appropriated" in the Title to 100-3-2, and the statement 
I 
that in order" to acquire the right to the use of unappro-
priated public water, an application must be filed," in no 
way indicates that this question must be immediately 
and finally adjudicated. ·This is in connection with the 
preceding Sec. 1 that rights to use can now be acquired 
only by filing with the State Engineer. Then, Sec. 2 
silnply indicates this filing as the first step in acquir-
ing use of unappropriated waters, and says this should 
he taken ''before commencing'' the construction of dis-
tributing ''rork~, or of \York tendjng ·to acquire such 
rights. Tl~cn, the other s~ep~ are set forth in ~uccecclinc 
section~. 
Then, coming to Sec. 8, dealing vvith matters to be 
considered by the State Engineer, the language is quoted: 
' 'If an application does not meet the require-
ments of this section, it should be rejected.'' 
There are a nu1nber of things set forth here, including the 
payment of fees, etc., including a reference to 100-2-1-±, 
'vhich, under certain circumstances, i1nposes upon the ap-
plicant, the pay1nent of the expenses of an exan1ination 
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and an investigation of the physical situation by the 
8tate Engineer. This is in1n1ediately followed by the 
language quoted. It does not appear to apply to the ques-
tion of unappropriated w·aters, \Yhich is a n1atter for 
the State Engineer's investigation and is not a matter 
\vhich is under the control of the applicant, so that he 
could n1a.ke his application ~'comply''. 
It is clear, fron1 the cases cited in our first brief and 
in the State· s brief, that there is no such eon1pulsion by 
reason of this language, as is contended. 
We must disagree, also, with the rule of interpreta-
tion (A. 11) to the effect that the Legislature, by repeal-
ing in 1939 the language in Sec. 8 that ''where there is no 
unappropriated \Vater in the proposed source of suppl)', 
it shall be the duty of the State Engineer to reject such 
application,'' intended the language of that repealed pro-
vision to remain in effect. The rule of construction, as 
\\~e understood it is exactly to the contrary. 
Another matter of misconception in this connection 
is the reference to the language in the quoted statutes 
(A. 10) as to "unappropriated \Vater in the proposed 
source." Fro1n this; it is argued that the "proposed 
~onrce" here is \\ ... eber River. Each of these applications 
recites, in paragraph 6, that the "source of ~upply" is 
''unnamed springs'' or ''spring areas.'' The trial court 
specifically found (R. 36) that "the waters involved ... 
::1re \Vaters arising fron1 springs and spring areas upon 
the lands of said defendant, and are sought to be ap-
pll (•d to beneficial use upon his said land.'' It certainly 
appear~ that at lea~t son1c of this \Vater from these 
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sources, if not all of it, is unappropriated. 
And so, the repeated statement that the respondent 
ha~ established that he has no right is incorrect, as is 
al~o the statement that anyone can raise the matter by 
~i1nply calling it to the attention of the court. They are 
attempting here to insert an allegedly adverse and prior 
right by merely asserting it in the brief. The illustra-
tion used (A. 6), by reference to a "quiet title" suit on 
the Walker Bank Building, would be more nearly in 
point if we were in an action to quiet title, and also, if in 
ciUCh suj t, the bank building had been erected on land 
owned by one of the parties. 
v 
In viev\r of what has been briefed, the question of 
what may be judicially noticed here is, perhaps, a matter 
of interest, rather than of any great importance. 
\Ve questioned ( 0. 2) the suggestion made in appel 
Ian t 's brief that the court could so notice Deer Creek and 
·'the details with respect thereto.'' However, in discuss-
ing appellant's lack of interest in any such matters, we 
traced the course of· water fron1 Weber River according 
to our kno,vledg-e. Now, the an~icus curiae brief says 
(A. 9): 
"It is our OJJ:.ni.on ... deer creek ... its 
scope ... and plan ... is judicially known.'~ 
It goes then into great length and detail of facts, and of 
the Gvvernment's intentions, and other applications not 
in the Record (A. 27), and says (A. 28): 
"A~ a result of all this, '"'"e believe the project 
is kno-vvn to this court.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Again, no authority is rited. The burden of having this 
court consider all the 1natters ~o presented is upon the 
party rlaiming the right to such consideration. It is quite 
elear that the court nuly not take jndieial kn<nYledg·e of 
these, or of "·hat it n1a~· kno"·· 
21 ~\.n1. J ur. p. 52 : 
· · Section 21. Judicial, a~ Distinguished fro1n 
~\.c.tual, Kno,vledge.-J udicial notice in any par-
ticular casp is not detern1ined or limited by the 
actual kno,vledge of the individual judge or rourt. 
There is a basic distinction between judicial no-
tice and judicial kno,vledge .... '' 
104-46-1 l-r.c.A. 1943 recites what facts the court may 
take notice of. Frorr1 this, it would appear that nothing 
that is recited here 1na~T be noticed, except the geography 
that is involved. From other statutes, however, and from 
interpretations in the general law, it appears that such 
geography may be considered; also, the existence of cities 
and towns, and the location of natural and important 
rivers and lakes (See 20 Am. J ur. p. 7 4, 77, 79). 
Bacon v. Plain City Irrig,at~on Company, 52 P. (2) 
427. In this case, the court held that even where there 
had been a deter1nination by the State Engineer in· a 
general adjudication proceeding under the statute, and 
he had filed this as a proposed decree under the statute 
in the said proceeding, that in another case, arising out 
of this determination, neither the trial judge in the 
san1e court \vhere that proceeding 'vas pending, nor the 
Snpretne Court on appeal, could take judicial notice of 
it. 
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The decision is reflected in the second syllabus, as 
follow::;: 
''Neither trial court nor reviewing court 
could take judicial notice of proposed determina-
tion of water rights filed by state engineer with 
clerk of court. where document was not made part 
of the pleadings in action on assessments levied 
against irrigation company (JJaws 1925, c. 100)." 
This would appear to eliminate any filings here in 
other ptoceedings, or any adjucations on any such fil. 
ings, or any determinations of the State Engineer with 
relations thereto. 
The general law on this subject, and as reflected by 
other decision8 of this. court, such as 76 Utah 243, 267; 
289 I~ .. 116, seen1s to be well reflected in the following 
quotations: 
"It was squarely held in Robison v. Kelly, 69 
. Utah 376, 2·55 P. 430, that the court cannot take 
·judicial knowledge of ·its own records in another 
and different case.'' 
20 An1. J ur. _p. 4_6: 
''Secti0n 16. GENERALLY.-It is a well-
intrenched part oi the judicial system that the 
judge sees only with judicial eyes and knows noth-
ing respecting any particular ·case of which he is 
not informed judicially.'' 
~0 Am. Jur. p. 48: 
... ,., Generally. speaking, n1atters of judicial 
notice ·have three material requisites: (1) The 
rnatter must be a n1attet -of common and general 
knowledge; ( 2) it Inust be well and authoritatively 
settled and not doubtful and uncertain; ( :1) and it 
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n1ust be kno\Yn to be \Yithin the lin1its of the juris-
diction of the court.'' 
:?0 ~un. J ur. p. 49 : 
''Section 18. 11ATTERS OF CO·MMON 
KXO,VLEDGE.-The n1atter of \Yhich a court will 
take judicial notice must be subject of common 
and general kno\\·ledge. In other words, judicial 
lmo,vledge of facts is measured by general knowl-
edge of the san1e facts .... '' 
:::0 Am. Jur. p. 51: 
~·Section 20. EXTENT OF CO·MMON 
KXO,\TLEDGE.-Jlldicial notice is based upon 
the obvious reason of convention and expediency, 
for it operates to save the time, trouble, and ex-
pense vvhich would be lost in establishing in the 
ordinar' 'vav facts ''7hich do not admit of contra-
. •' 
di t . " cIon ..... 
\~I 
Under this, we will try to throw some light generally 
on other matters discussed in the last 20 pages of the 
brief. 
These are devoted to a somewhat enlarged and fanci-
fully elaborated picture of reclamation achievements and 
Government intentions, to some propaganda apparently 
to influence the court to believe that everybody is in-
terested in and excited about what \Ve propose doing 
writh some little springs on about 8 or 10 acres of land, 
in advising and warning the court as to its future policies, 
and to considerable caustic comment on our unfortunate 
ignoranee of irrigation n1atters and irrigation law. 
This last is a little disconcerting to a couple of old 
~hovel pushing irrigators. 
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w.e are sure, also, that there is no great or universal 
concern or interest in the outcome here, and that no 
public calamity is likely to result. 
Somewhat bitter comment is made on our state-
Inents: (1) that the filings on the Weber River, if in evi-
dence, contain ''no intimation of purpose to recapture, 
and there is before the court no intimation of this," and 
(2) that it "can't be assumed as probable" that the 
Reclan1ation · Department will attempt to repasses the 
water involved. 
The first statement is merely a correct statement of 
fact. The second statement of probability is made in 
relation to the language used by this court as to the duty 
to grant an application, if there is reasonable probability 
that water may be made available. These are called as-
sumptions on our part, and then it is confidently asserted 
that the United States does intend· to reclaim this 
seepage,· apparently directly. And, if this is true, then, 
of course, to reclaim it on the lands of every farmer 
where seepage 1nay appear from increased irrigation. 
lt is stated that we cannot help our case by "argu-
Inent and conjecture," and yet, it seems clear to us that 
these are exactly what the writer of the -amicus curia•e 
brief is using throughout. He then introduces an argu-
nlent 'vhich defeats about all that he has contended pre-
viously. 
It vvas theretofore repeatedly argued that by reason 
of the filings on the Weber River, all the \Vater con1ing 
frorn Deer Creek \vas thereby already appropriated. That 
hy rea~on thereof, all the 'vater arising fron1 inereaRecl 
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Irrigation therefron1, including the water here involved, 
and any other draining toward Utah Lake had been thus 
appropriated. 
Xo"y' he interjeets filing No. 12144 (A. 27), which 
is a governn1ent filing on Utah Lake, based on withhold-
ing 30,000 acre feet in Deer Creek "·in lieu of certain 
seepage return flo'Y and/or other waters belonging to the 
United States which will flow into and augment the 
"-ater supply of lTtah Lake as a result of the construc-
tion and operation of Deer Creek R.eservoir'' (A. 32). 
This is an acknovvledgement that such waters are under 
the jurisdiction of the State Engineer. 
And of course, the Government must have considered 
its filing Xo. 12144 to be on unappropriated water, and 
on "-ater, according to the previous argument as to the 
statutes (_ .... ~. 10), which the Engineer must have found 
were unappropriated vvaters before approving this ap-
plication. Then, if these waters were unappropriated and 
subject to this lovver filing by the Government itself, how 
can anticus curiae, speaking here for the Government, 
contend as against us that the san1e vvaters vvere already 
appropriated by the Weber River filing. The G-overn-
ment's actions do not conform with the assertions of its 
spokesman. 
FurthermorP, it thus becomes apparent that it is not 
the intention of the Government to go in and clain1, and 
thus prevent the use of seeps on farms over the system, 
btt.t is rather the intention that these be generally put 
tf) heneficial use by the farn1ers, Vv .. hich is a high public 
use, and allo,ved then to flow into the Lake as the ulti-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
mate drainage from the whole project. This would, at 
least, seem "probable". 
While the brief cites no new authority, as we have 
above indicated, it does refer to two Federal cases, the 
Ide case and the Raga case, already cited by both parties 
to the action. We are somewhat belabored because of our 
claim that these cases are not of the sam·e character as 
the one here presented, and for mentioning some other 
distinguishing features in our brief. Yet, both of those 
cases were cases directly on and involving the determina-
ation; and quieting title to, water rights. And, if it did 
not already appear from the cases cited in our first 
brief, it certainly appears from the briefs here now that 
this case does not and cannot involve any such determina-
tion or adjudication. 
So far as we can see, every other distinguishing 
feature mentioned by us was correctly stated, and in 
view of the nature of this action, the co1nment (A. 19-20) 
is out of bounds, to say the least, and the statement (A. 
21) that the Ide ease is not distinguishable "unless it be 
ground of distinction that the Shoshone Project was con-
structed in Wyoming and the Provo River Project in 
Utah ... that seepage water from Shoshone Project 
arose in a ravine and from the Provo Project in a 
spring,'' is absurd. 
CONCLUSION 
It appears to us that the amicus curz.a.e brief can 
hring in no ne1v parties or any new or additional issues. 
That it adds n~thing by 'vay of support to the only clain1 
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of the appellant, \vhich is pleaded and in issue, but, on 
the other hand, asserts that ap·pellant has no right under 
this ~laim. 
That ,, ... eber River filings are not before the court, 
and are not in issue under the pleadings. That if they 
\vere in evidence and in issue, they would not consti-
tute an appropriation of any \Vaters whatsoever. That 
there is no\v here no claim of prior appropriations con-
tended for. 
That, as to the seepage waters involved, it is prob-
able that at least some of these are subject to approp·ria-
tion and beneficial use, and that this is a matter of final 
investigation and determination by the State Engineer. 
That, in approving the said applications, he has not 
abused his discretion, but has proceeded properly in the 
premises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MULLINER 
Attorneys for Resp,ondent 
Clarence T. Jones 
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